research in the field of artificial intelligence and law, as well as my own suggestion that earlier cases can themselves be thought of as determining a priority ordering on legal reasons, and that precedent then requires later courts only to reach a decision that is consistent with this ordering.
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Finally, Section 5 ties the two earlier parts of the paper together. Taking default logic as a model of ordinary natural reasoning, I show in this section how the constraints imposed by precedent can be coded into a default theory-with defaults representing the court's own reasons, further defaults representing the reasons provided by previous cases, and still further defaults representing the requirement that the reasons provided by previous cases are to be assigned a higher priority than the court's own reasons. It tuen turns out that a court reasoning on the basis of a default theory like this-engaging, that is, in constrained natural reasoning-will arrive at a decision satisfying the requirements of precedent.
The substantive goal of this exercise, once again, is to sketch a new model of reasoning with precedent-not as reasoning with rules, nor as natural reasoning, nor as something in between, but as a form of natural reasoning in which the weights, or priorities, that would normally be assigned to reasons may be altered in accord with reasons provided by the existing case base. There is also, however, a methodological goal, especially relevant to readers of this volume, and that is to demonstrate the kind of work that can be carried out on the basis of a detailed of theory of reasons, their weights or priorities, and their interactions.
A prioritized default logic
We begin with a brief overview of a simple prioritized default logic, taking as background an ordinary logical system in which ∧, ∨, ⊃, and ¬ are the operations of conjunction, disjunction, implication, and negation, and in which is the trivially true proposition. The turnstile indicates ordinary logical consequence, so that E X means that the proposition X follows from the set of propositions E.
Where X and Y are propositions, we take X → Y as the default rule that allows us to conclude Y , by default, once X has been established. To illustrate: if we suppose that B is the proposition that Tweety is a bird and F the proposition that Tweety can fly, then B → F is the rule that allows us to conclude that Tweety can fly, by default, once it has been established that Tweety is a bird. We assume two functions-Premise and Conclusionthat pick out the premises and conclusions of default rules: if r is the default X → Y , then Premise(r) is the proposition X and Conclusion(r) is the proposition Y . The second of these functions is lifted from individual defaults to sets of defaults in the obvious way: where S is a set of defaults, Conclusion(S) = {Conclusion(r) : r ∈ S} is the set of conclusions of those defaults belonging to S.
Default rules are to be thought of as expressing the reason relation. In the case of our example, then, what the default B → F indicates is that the premise that Tweety is a bird functions as a reason for the conclusion that Tweety flies.
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Some defaults, as well as their corresponding reasons, have greater weight, or higher priority, than others.
6 This information is represented through an ordering relation < on default rules, where the statement r < r means that the default r has a higher priority than 5 I argue in my (2012) that reasons are provided, not by defaults in general, but only by defaults that are triggered-a concept that will be defined shortly. This refinement is not necessary for the current discussion, and I will ignore it. 6 Though I will use both terms, I prefer to speak in terms of a priority ordering on reasons, rather than of weight, for two reasons: first, I allow for nonlinear priority orderings, while the concept of weight tends to suggest linearity; second, I allow for the possibility that there may be only an ordinal ranking among reasons, while the concept of weight suggests that cardinal comparisons must also be available.
the default r. Suppose, for example, that P is the proposition that Tweety is a penguin, so that P → ¬F is the default allowing us to conclude that Tweety cannot fly once it is established that Tweety is a penguin. Then if we take r 1 as the earlier default B → F and r 2 as this new default, it is natural to assume that r 1 < r 2 .
We will focus to begin with on fixed priority default theories-theories, that is, in which all priorities among default rules are fixed in advance. Such a theory is a structure of the form ∆ = W, D, < , in which W is a set of ordinary statements, D is a set of default rules, and < is a strict partial ordering on D, representing priority.
Defaults are often thought of as special rules of inference that can be used to extend the conclusions derivable from a body of hard information beyond its ordinary logical consequences, and for this reason, the conclusion sets supported by default theories are generally referred to as extensions. We will concentrate here, however, not on extensions themselves, but on on the sets of defaults through which they can be generated. To begin with, then, let us define a scenario based on a default theory ∆ = W, D, < simply as some subset S of the set D of defaults contained in that theory. From an intuitive standpoint, a scenario is supposed to represent the particular subset of default rules that have actually been selected by the reasoning agent as providing sufficient support for their conclusions-those rules that can then be applied to the hard information from W to generate an extension. Not every scenario based on a default theory is intuitively acceptable, of course; some might contain what seems to be the wrong selection of defaults. The goal, therefore, is to characterize the proper scenarios-those sets of defaults that could be accepted by an ideal reasoning agent based on the information contained in the original theory.
These ideas can be illustrated by returning to our example, with r 1 and r 2 as the defaults B → F and P → ¬F . If we suppose that Tweety is both a bird and a penguin, then the information from this example can be captured by the default theory ∆ 1 = W, D, < , where W = {P, P ⊃ B}, where D = {r 1 , r 2 }, and where r 1 < r 2 . The set W contains the basic information that Tweety is a penguin, and that this entails the fact that he is a bird; the set D contains the two defaults; and the ordering tells us that the default about penguins has higher priority than the default about birds. This theory allows four possible scenarios-S 1 = ∅, S 2 = {r 1 }, S 3 = {r 2 }, or S 4 = {r 1 , r 2 }-corresponding to the situations in which the reasoning agent endorses neither of the two available defaults, only the first default, only the second, or both. From an intuitive standpoint, though, it seems that the agent should endorse the default r 2 , and only that default, leading to the conclusion that Tweety does not fly. Therefore, only the third of these four scenarios, S 3 = {r 2 }, should be classified as proper.
How, then, can we define the proper scenarios? The definition I offer depends on three initial concepts-triggering, conflict, and defeat.
The triggered defaults represent those that are applicable in the context of a particular scenario; they are defined as the defaults whose premises are entailed by that scenario-those defaults, that is, whose premises follow from the hard information belonging to the default theory together with the conclusions of the defaults already endorsed. More exactly, if S is a scenario based on the theory ∆ = W, D, < , the defaults triggered in this scenario are those belonging to the set
To illustrate by returning to the Tweety example, suppose S 1 = ∅. In the context of this scenario, both r 1 and r 2 are triggered, since W ∪ Conclusion(S 1 ) Premise(r 1 ) and W ∪ Conclusion(S 1 ) Premise(r 2 ).
A default will be classified as conflicted in the context of a scenario if the agent is already committed to the negation of its conclusion-that is, the conflicted defaults in the context of the scenario S, based on the theory ∆ = W, D, < , are those belonging to the set
This idea can be illustrated through another example. Suppose that Q, R, and P are the statements that Nixon is a Quaker, that Nixon is a Republican, and that Nixon is a pacifist; and let r 1 and r 2 be the defaults Q → P and R → ¬P , instances for Nixon of the generalizations that Quakers tend to be pacifists and that Republicans tend not to be pacifists. Then, since Nixon was, in fact, both a Quaker and a Republican, we can represent an agent's information through the theory ∆ 2 = W, D, < , where W = {Q, R},
where D = {r 1 , r 2 }, and where < is empty, since neither default has a higher priority than the other. Now imagine that, on whatever grounds, the agent decides to endorse one of these two defaults-say r 1 , supporting the conclusion P -and is therefore reasoning in the context of the scenario S 1 = {r 1 }. In this context, the other default-r 2 , supporting the conclusion ¬P -will be conflicted, since W ∪ Conclusion(S 1 ) ¬ Conclusion(r 2 ).
Finally, defeat. Although this concept is surprisingly difficult to define in full generality, the basic idea is simple enough, and can serve as the basis of a preliminary definition. 7 Very roughly, a default will be classified as defeated in the context of a scenario S, based on the theory ∆ = W, D, < , whenever there is a stronger triggered default that supports a conflicting conclusion-whenever, that is, the default belongs to the set
there is a default r ∈ Triggered W,D (S) such that
(1) r < r ,
7 See Chapter 8 of my (2012) for a discussion of the difficulties involved in arriving at a general definition.
This idea can be illustrated by returning to the Tweety example, the theory ∆ 1 = W, D, < , where W = {P, P ⊃ B}, where D = {r 1 , r 2 } with r 1 and r 2 as the defaults B → F and P → ¬F , and where r 1 < r 2 . We can suppose once again that the agent has not yet endorsed either of the two defaults, so that the initial scenario is S 1 = ∅, and neither default is conflicted. Still, the default r 1 is defeated, since r 2 is triggered, and we have both (1) r 1 < r 2 and (2) W ∪ {Conclusion(r 2 )} ¬ Conclusion(r 1 ).
Once the underlying notions of triggering, conflict, and defeat are in place, we can define the notion of a default that is binding in the context of the scenario S, based on the theory ∆ = W, D, < , as one that is triggered in this context, but neither conflicted nor defeatedas a default, that is, belonging to the set
The concept can again be illustrated with Tweety, under the assumption that the agent's scenario is S 1 = ∅. Here, the default r 1 , supporting the conclusion F , is triggered in the context of this scenario, and it is not conflicted, but as we have just seen, it is defeated by the default r 2 ; and so it is not binding. By contrast, the default r 2 , supporting the conclusion ¬F , is likewise triggered, not conflicted, and in this case not defeated either. This default is, therefore, binding.
We can now turn, at last, to the notion of a proper scenario. There are again some complexities involved in the full definition of this idea, though these need not concern us here. 
We can think of the defaults from a proper scenario as presenting, not just reasons, but good reasons, in the context of that scenario. An agent who has accepted a set of defaults forming a proper scenario, then, is in an enviable position. Such an agent has already accepted all and only those defaults that it recognizes as presenting good reasons; the agent, therefore, has no incentive either to abandon any of the defaults already accepted, or to accept any others.
To illustrate, we return one last time to our examples. The first, Tweety, was the theory
where W = {P, P ⊃ B}, where D = {r 1 , r 2 } with r 1 as B → F and r 2 as P → ¬F , and where r 1 < r 2 . We noted earlier that, of the four possible scenarios based on this theory-that is, S 1 = ∅, S 2 = {r 1 }, S 3 = {r 2 }, and S 4 = {r 1 , r 2 }-only the third seemed attractive from an intuitive point of view; and with our definitions in place, the reader can now verify that only S 3 is proper. Our second example, Nixon, was the theory ∆ 2 = W, D, < , where W = {Q, R}, where D = {r 1 , r 2 } with r 1 as Q → P and r 2 as R → ¬P , and where < is empty. This theory allows two proper scenarios, both S 1 = {r 1 } and S 2 = {r 2 }. There are a number of ways of interpreting situations like this, in which default theories allow multiple proper scenarios; one is to suppose that our standards of rationality certify each of these scenarios as acceptable outcomes, without favoring one over the other.
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We have concentrated thus far on fixed priority default theories, in which priority relations among default rules are fixed in advance. In fact, however, some of the most important things we reason about, and reason about by default, are the priorities among the very default rules that guide our default reasoning-we offer reasons for taking some of our reasons more seriously than others. Although this process may sound complicated, it turns out that the basic theory can be extended to account for this kind of reasoning in four simple steps.
The first step is to enrich our background language with the resources to enable formal reasoning about priorities among defaults: a new set of individual constants, to be interpreted as names of defaults, together with a relation symbol representing priority. For the sake of simplicity, we will assume that each of these new constants has the form n X , for some subscript X, and that each such constant refers to the default r X , or in schematic contexts, that the constants n, n , n and so on refer to the default rules r, r , r and so on. And we will assume also that our language now contains the relation symbol ≺, representing priority among defaults.
To illustrate, suppose that r 1 and r 2 are the defaults A → B and C → ¬B, respectively, and that r 3 is the priority default D → n 1 ≺ n 2 . Then since n 1 refers to r 1 and n 2 refers r 2 , what r 3 says is that D functions as a reason for assigning r 2 a higher priority than r 1 . As a result, we would expect that, when all three of these defaults are triggered-that is, when A, C, and D all hold-the default r 1 will generally be defeated by r 2 , since the two defaults have conflicting conclusions. Of course, since r 3 is itself a default, the information it provides concerning the priority between r 1 and r 2 is defeasible, and could likewise be defeated.
The second step is to shift our attention from theories of the form W, D, < -that is, from fixed priority default theories-to theories containing a set W of ordinary propositions as well as a set D of defaults, but no priority relation on the defaults that is fixed in advance.
Instead, both W and D may contain initial information concerning priority relations among defaults, and then conclusions about these priorities, like any other conclusions, are arrived at through default reasoning. Because conclusions about the priorities among defaults might themselves vary depending on other conclusions drawn by the reasoning agent, theories like this, of the form ∆ = W, D , are known as variable priority default theories; it is stipulated as part of the definition that the set W of hard information in such a theory must contain each instance of the asymmetry schema (n < n ) ⊃ ¬(n < n) in which the variables are replaced with names of the defaults from D.
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Now suppose the agent accepts some particular scenario S based on a variable priority theory; the third step, then, is to lift the priority ordering implicit in the agent's scenario to an explicit ordering that can be used in default reasoning. This is done in the simplest possible way, through the introduction of a derived priority ordering < S , defined as follows:
The statement r < S r is taken to mean that r has a higher priority than r according to the scenario S. The force of the definition, then, is that this relation holds just in case n ≺ n can be derived from the conclusions of the defaults belonging to S, taken together with the hard information from W. Because W contains all instances of asymmetry, the derived priority relation < S is guaranteed to be asymmetric.
The fourth and final step is to define the notion of a proper scenario for a variable priority default theory. This is accomplished by leveraging our previous definition of proper scenarios for fixed priority theories of the form W, D, < , where < can be any strict partial ordering whatsoever. Using this previous definition, we can now stipulate that S is a proper scenario for the variable priority theory ∆ = W, D just in case S is a proper scenario, in the previous sense, for the particular fixed priority theory W, D, < S , where W and D are carried over from the variable priority theory ∆, and where < S is the priority relation derived from the scenario S itself. The intuitive picture is this. In searching for a proper scenario, the agent arrives at some scenario S, which then entails conclusions about various aspects of the world, including priority relations among the agent's own defaults. If these derived priority relations can be used to justify the agent in accepting exactly the scenario S that the agent began with, then that scenario is proper.
These various definitions can be illustrated through a variant of the previous Nixon example in which it is useful to adopt, not the epistemic perspective of a third party trying to decide whether or not Nixon is a pacifist, but instead, the practical perspective of a young Nixon trying to decide whether or not to become a pacifist. As before, we take r 1 and r 2 as the defaults Q → P and R → ¬P , where P , Q, and R are the propositions that Nixon is a pacifist, a Quaker, and a Republican. Given our current perspective, these two defaults should now be interpreted as providing practical, rather than epistemic, reasons: r 1 corresponds to the fact that, as a Quaker, Nixon has reason to become a pacifist, and r 2 to the fact that, as a Republican, he has reason not to become a pacifist.
In light of his conflicting reasons, let us imagine that Nixon seeks advice, first, from an elder of his Friends Meeting, who tells him that his religious reason should be given more weight than his political reason, but second, from an official of the Republican Party, who tells him exactly the opposite. If we take A and B as the respective statements of the religious and political figures, then the advice of these two authorities can be represented through the defaults r 3 and r 4 , where r 3 is A → n 2 ≺ n 1 and r 4 is B → n 1 ≺ n 2 . Nixon is now faced with his initial conflicting reasons, as well as further conflicting reasons as to how that initial conflict should be resolved. Finally, though, let us suppose that he seeks further counsel, perhaps from his wife, Pat, who tells him that the advice of the religious figure is to be preferred to that of the party official. If we take C as Pat's statement, her advice can be represented through the default r 5 , where r 5 is C → n 4 ≺ n 3 .
The variable priority default theory that provides the background for Nixon's reasoning is ∆ 3 = W, D , where W contains the propositions A, B, C, Q, and R-according to which
Nixon is a Quaker and a Republican, and his religious and political advisors, as well as his wife, said what they did-and where D now contains r 1 , r 2 , r 3 , r 4 , and r 5 . 11 As the reader can verify, this theory allows the unique proper scenario S 1 = {r 1 , r 3 , r 5 }, supporting the conclusions that r 4 < r 3 , that r 2 < r 1 , and that P . The scenario corresponds to the course of action in which Nixon is moved by Pat's advice to take the advice of the religious figure more seriously than that of the political official, and so accepts the religious figure's recommendation that his religious reason is to be preferred to his political reason, and therefore accepts pacifism on the basis of his religious reason.
Precedent
We have focused so far on default logic and its relation to the theory of reasons, including the way in which it allows for reasoning about the priorities among reasons. Let us turn now to the topic of precedent in the common law. I will quickly review my own proposal that the concept should be understood in terms of an ordering relation on legal reasons.
11 The set W must also contain appropriate instances of the asymmetry schema, but since these can be generated automatically from the defaults contained in that theory, I will not mention them explicitly.
We start with a few basic concepts. Legal cases will be represented in terms of factors, where a factor is a legally significant fact or pattern of facts. 12 Cases in different areas of the law will be characterized by different sets of factors, of course. In the domain of trade secrets law, for example, where the factor-based analysis has been developed most extensively, a case will typically concern the issue of whether the defendant has gained an unfair competitive advantage over the plaintiff through the misappropriation of a trade secret; and here the factors involved might turn on, say, questions concerning whether the plaintiff took measures to protect the trade secret, whether a confidential relationship existed between the plaintiff and the defendant, whether the information acquired was reverse-engineerable or in some other way publicly available, and the extent to which this information did, in fact, lead to a real competitive advantage for the defendant.
The analysis set out here relies on several simplifications, which would have to be relaxed in a more complete theory. We will assume, first, that all factors have polarities, favoring one side or the other; second, that the factor representation is separable, so that factors have whatever force they do regardless of the presence of other factors; and third, that the reasoning under consideration involves only a single step, proceeding at once from the factors present in a case to a decision for the plaintiff or defendent, rather than moving through a series of intermediate legal concepts. Finally, it must be emphasized that the mere ability to understand a case in terms of the factors it presents itself requires a significant degree of legal expertise, which is presupposed here.
Formally, then, let us begin by postulating a set F of legal factors. A fact situation X, of the sort presented in a legal case, can then be defined as some particular subset of these factors: X ⊆ F . We will let F π = {f The analysis of legal cases in terms of factors, initially taken only as points along legally significant dimensions, was first introduced by Rissland and Ashley (1987) ; see Ashley (1990) for a canonical treatment.
the plaintiff and F δ = {f δ 1 , . . . , f δ m } the set of factors favoring the defendant. Given our assumption that each factor favors one side of the other, we can suppose that the entire set of legal factors is exhausted by those favoring the plaintiff together with those favoring the defendant:
Where s is a side-either π or δ-we let s represent the opposite side: π = δ and δ = π. And where X is a fact situation, we let X s represent the factors from X that support the side s:
A precedent case will be represented as a fact situation together with an outcome and a rule justifying that outcome. Such a case, then, can be defined as a triple of the form c = X, r, s , where X is a fact situation containing the legal factors presented by the case, r is the rule of the case, and s is its outcome, a decision for a particular side.
We will suppose that the rule r contained in a precedent case is a special factor default rule of the form Y → s, where Y is a factor reason favoring the side s-that is, some nonempty set of factors uniformly favoring s as an outcome, a nonempty subset of and that {f
is not a factor default, since the factor reason that forms its premise favors the side π, but its conclusion is δ.
We impose two coherence constraints relating the rule of a precedent case c = X, r, s to the facts of the case as well as its outcome. The first is that the rule of the case must actually apply to the fact situation: Premise(r) ⊆ X. The second is that the conclusion of that rule must match the outcome of the case itself: Conclusion(r) = s.
These various concepts can be illustrated through the concrete case c 1 = X 1 , r 1 , s 1 , where Evidently, the case satisfies our two coherence constraints: the rule of the case is applicable to the facts, and the conclusion of this rule matches the outcome of the case. This particular precedent, then, represents a case in which the court decided for the plaintiff by applying or introducing a rule according to which the presence of the factors f A case base is defined simply as a set Γ of cases-a set of fact situations presented to various courts, together with their outcomes and the rules justifying these outcomes. It is a case base of this sort that will be taken to represent the common law in some area, and to constrain the decisions of future courts.
To motivate my proposed notion of precedential constraint-according to which the concept is to be understood in terms of an ordering on reasons-let us return to the case as justification, the court is telling us that the reason for its decision-that is, Premise(r 1 ), or {f π 1 }-is sufficient to justify a decision in favor of the plaintiff. But second, with its decision for the plaintiff, the court is also telling us that this reason must be stronger than the strongest reason presented by the case in favor of the defendant.
To put this precisely, let us first stipulate that, if X and Y are factor reasons favoring the same side, then Y is at least as strong as X for that side-or alternatively, X is at least as weak as Y -whenever X ⊆ Y . Returning to our example, then, where
it is clear that the strongest reason present for the defendant is X As far as the priority ordering goes, then, the earlier court is telling us at least that Generalizing from this example, we can now define the priority relation < c derived from the single case c = X, r, s by stipulating, where W and Z are factor reasons, that W < c Z if and only if W ⊆ X s and Premise(r) ⊆ Z.
Once we have defined this priority relation derived from a single case, we can introduce a priority relation < Γ derived from an entire case base Γ in the natural way, by stipulating that one reason Z has a higher priority than another W according to Γ whenever that priority is supported by some particular case from the case base, or more formally, that W < Γ Z if and only if W < c Z for some case c from Γ.
And we can then define a case base as inconsistent if it provides conflicting information about the priority relation among reasons-telling us, for some pair of reasons X and Y , that each has a higher priority than the other, or that
A case base can be defined as consistent as long as it is not inconsistent.
Given this notion of consistency, we can at last turn to the requirement of precedent itself. The intuition is simply that, in deciding a case, a court is required by precedent only to preserve the consistency of the background case base. Suppose, more exactly, that a court is confronted with a new fact situation X against the background of a consistent case base Γ. Then what precedent requires is that the court base its decision on some rule r leading to an outcome s such that the case base resulting from supplementing Γ with this new decision-that is, the case base Γ ∪ { X, r, s }-remains consistent.
This idea can be illustrated by assuming as background the case base Γ 1 = {c 1 }, containing only the previous case c 1 = X 1 , r 1 , s 1 , where Generalizing, then, let us postulate a set F containing, for each factor reason Y favoring the side s, a factor default of the form Y → s, expressing the fact that the presence of the factors from Y counts as a reason for s. For convenience, we will also define a weak strength ordering among factor default rules favoring the same side, mirroring our earlier strength ordering on the factor reasons that form their premises: where r and r are factor default rules, then r ≤ r -that is, r is at least as strong as r-just in case Premise(r) ⊆ Premise(r ).
But if courts do not introduce new factor default rules with their decisions-if these rules are already present, implicit in the meaning of factors-then what effect do the decisions of courts have? The simplest answer is that these decisions impose an ordering relation on factor default rules, telling us which of these rules are to be assigned higher priority than others. This idea has been explored by a number of writers, as well as in my own previous work, but it does not give us what we want.
13 It provides, at best, an account of defeasible reasoning with legal information alone, not a theory of the way in which this legal information constrains an agent's natural reasoning. There is no description of a reasoning agent's own preferences, or values, or of the way in which precedent impacts the decisions that an agent would otherwise reach.
To fill this gap, we begin by introducing special defaults to represent the agent's own values, as they are reflected in the agent's preferences among factor reasons and their corresponding default rules. Where r and r are factor default rules favoring opposing sides, then, let us define a value default as a rule of the form → n ≺ n ; the force of a default like this is that, according to the agent's own values, the rule r is assigned a higher priority than the rule r. 14 For the sake of simplicity, we will ignore the reasoning, surely very complex, through which an agent arrives at his or her own ordering on factor defaults, as well as any specific reasons justifying components of this ordering; we will likewise suppose that there is no priority ordering among value defaults, unrealistically treating all of the agent's values on a par.
In order to see how reasoning with precedent can be understood as constrained natural reasoning, it will be useful to consider, first, how a problem can be coded as a default theory 13 See Prakken and Sartor (1998) for a wide-ranging and detailed development of the idea; my own treatment, based on the current account of precedent, is found in my (2011). 14 I refer to these rules as "value defaults" only for terminological clarity, using this phrase in a technical sense, without intending to advance any philosophical claims about the relation between reasons and values.
In the same way, when I speak of an agent's values, also in a technical sense, I mean to refer only to that agent's reasons for ranking one factor reason over another, and so for ranking one factor default over another.
without any constraints at all, reflecting only the reasoning agent's own values. Suppose, then, that a fact situation X is presented for adjudication to an agent whose values are represented by a set V of value defaults. We can take D V = F ∪ V as the set of defaults guiding the agent's reasoning-that is, the entire set F of factor defaults, together with the set V of value defaults, reflecting the agent's own reasons for ranking some factor defaults as more important than others. We let the hard information W X to which these defaults are applied include X-the facts of the situation at hand-together with all instances of the weak transitivity schemata
in which the variables are replaced with names of defaults from F . The point of these schemata is simply to guarantee that, whatever priority ordering on factor defaults the agent finally settles on, it must respect the weak strength ordering defined earlier on rules favoring the same side. The problem presented by the fact situation X to an agent with values V can then be represented by the variable priority default theory
where D V = F ∪ V and W X includes X together with instances of weak transitivity for all defaults from F .
To illustrate, suppose an agent is presented with the situation X 2 = {f
Out of the entire set F of factor defaults, only four are applicable to this situation:
And let us imagine that the agent's particular set V 1 of value defaults contains only the single rule
according to which the factor default r 2 is to be prioritized over r 1 ; intuitively, this represents the agent's view that {f δ 1 } is a more important reason in favor of δ than {f π 1 } is in favor of π. The problem presented by this fact situation to an agent with these values, then, is represented by the default theory ∆ X 2 ,V 1 = W X 2 , D V 1 , where the set D V 1 contains all factor defaults together with the single value default r 5 , and where W X 2 contains the factors from X 2 together with appropriate instances of weak transitivity.
It is easy to verify that this default theory allows the single proper scenario S 1 = {r 2 , r 3 , r 4 , r 5 }, supporting the conclusion that r 1 < r 2 , in accord with the reasoning agent's values, and that the situation X 2 should be decided for the defendant. Note that r 1 , supporting a decision for the plaintiff, is not allowed, since, according to the agent's values, this rule is defeated by the stronger r 2 , supporting the opposite conclusion. Note also that the scenario contains three separate rules-r 2 , r 3 , and r 4 -supporting a decision for the defendant. My interpretation of this is that the agent is free to choose one of the broader rules r 2 or r 3 , or the narrower rule r 4 , to justify his or her decision; this choice is determined-if it is determined at all-by information that is not represented in the current framework. Now, to show how natural reasoning-reasoning based on default theories of the kind just developed, reflecting only the agent's own values-can be constrained by legal reasons, I
introduce two new classes of default rules. The first is the class of case defaults, representing the reasons provided by previous cases. Where c = X, r, s is a case, with r as the rule supporting the winning side s, and with r = X s → s as the rule based on the strongest reason present for the opposite side, this case will be said to generate the case default c → n ≺ n.
The meaning of this case default is simply that the case itself, or the fact that it was decided as it was, provides a reason for assigning a higher priority to r than to r -a reason for assigning a higher priority to the rule for the winning side than to the rule based on the strongest reason present for the losing side.
Value defaults and case defaults can conflict, of course. Given two factor defaults r and r favoring different sides, an agent's value default, reflecting the agent's own values, might rank r above r, while a case default ranks r above r . In a situation like that, which of the two conflicting factor defaults should the agent apply? The answer is that an agent reasoning under the constraints of precedent-a court, as we will say-is required to favor the case default over its own value default. This information is carried, finally, by a third class of default rules. Where r is a value default and r a case default, a precedent defaut can be defined as a rule of the form → n ≺ n , according to which the case default is to be assigned higher priority than the value default. It is worth noting where these new defaults fall in the hierarchy. Factor defaults provide reasons for deciding a case for some particualr side, plaintiff or defendant. Both value defaults and case defaults provide reasons for assigning some factor defaults a higher priority than others-and so, for ranking some reasons for deciding a case for some particular side above others. Precedent defaults, finally, provide reasons for assigning a higher priority to case defaults than to value defaults-and so, for ranking some reasons for ranking reasons for deciding a case for some particular side above other such reasons.
Let us now consider how these various ideas can be pulled together into a default theory representing the problem presented by a fact situation for a court reasoning, not only on the basis of its own values, but under the constraints of precedent. We will take F , once again, as the entire set of factor defaults, and V as a set of value defaults representing the court's own values, or priorities among factor defaults. Where Γ is a case base, we will let C Γ be the set containing each case default generated by a case from Γ, and we will let P V,Γ be the set of precedent defaults ranking every case default from C Γ above every value default from V.
The entire set D V,Γ of defaults guiding the agent's reasoning can be defined as the union of these factor, value, case, and precedent defaults-that is, D V,Γ = F ∪V ∪C Γ ∪P V,Γ . The hard information W X,Γ to which these defaults are applied will include both X and Γ-the facts of the situation at hand, together with the set of cases providing the context within which this situation is considered-as well as appropriate instances of the weak transitivity schemata A court reasoning with a theory of this kind can legitimately be described as engaged in a process of constrained natural reasoning: the court is reasoning in the natural way, on the basis of its own values, except when those values conflict with decisions reached in previous cases, in which case the court must then defer to the previous decisions. It is not difficult to verify that a court reasoning with such a default theory will satisfy the requirement of precedent, defined in the previous section, in the sense that a decision based on any factor default belonging to any proper scenario based on the theory will be consistent with the background case base. Put more precisely, we have the following observation:
Where Γ is a consistent case base, X a fact situation, and V a set of values, let ∆ X,V,Γ represent the decision problem presented by the fact situation X to a court with values V under precedential constraints derived from a case base Γ.
Then a factor default rule r supporting the outcome s belongs to some proper scenario based on ∆ X,V,Γ just in case Γ ∪ { X, r, s } is consistent.
This observation-that the results of constrained natural reasoning satisfy the requirements of precedent-can be illustrated by continuing with our earlier example, in which the situation X 2 = {f
} is presented to a court whose values are represented by the set V 1 = {r 5 }, where the value default r 5 , displayed earlier, provides a reason for prioritizing the factor default r 2 over r 1 . This time, however, we will suppose that the situation is evaluated under precedential constraints derived from the background case base Γ 1 = {c 1 }, considered at the end of Section 4, containing the single case c 1 = X 1 , r 1 , s 1 , where
where r 1 , again, is {f π 1 } → π, and where s 1 is π. We then have C Γ 1 = {r 6 } as the set containing the single case default derived from the single background case, where
and r 7 is {f δ 1 , f δ 2 } → δ. We have P V 1 ,Γ 1 = {r 8 } as the set containing the single precedent default necessary to rank the single case default from C Γ 1 above the single value default from V 1 , where
And we thus have
as the entire set of factor, value, case, and precedent defaults guiding the court's reasoning. The hard information W X 2 ,Γ 1 to which these defaults are applied will include the set X 2 of case facts, the set Γ 1 of cases that form the background context, as well as all instances of weak transitivity for factor defaults.
The resulting default theory ∆ X 2 ,V 1 ,Γ 1 = W X 2 ,Γ 1 , D V 1 ,Γ 1 therefore represents the problem presented to the court.
It is easy to see that the default theory ∆ X 2 ,V 1 ,Γ 1 supports the two extensions S 2 = {r 1 , r 6 , r 8 } and S 3 = {r 3 , r 4 , r 6 , r 8 }. It follows from our observation, then, that a decision based on any of the factor defaults contained in either of these two extensions-that is, a decision based on any of r 1 , r 3 , or r 4 -is consistent with the background case base, and so satisfies the requirements of precedent in the sense defined earlier. The court's reasoning is constrained in such a way that it is bound to reach a decision satisfying the requirements of precedent.
It is useful to compare the scenarios supported by the constrained default theory ∆ X 2 ,V 1 ,Γ 1 with S 1 = {r 2 , r 3 , r 4 , r 5 }, supported by the earlier theory ∆ X 2 ,V 1 , in which the court reasons in an unconstrained way, entirely on the basis of its own values, about the same situation.
Both S 2 and S 3 , supported by the constrained theory, contain the precedent default r 8 , according to which the case default r 6 has higher priority than the value default r 5 . Both S 2 and S 3 , therefore, contain r 6 rather than r 5 , which is itself defeated by r 6 . It follows from r 6 that r 1 , according to which the plaintiff is favored on the basis of f π 1 , has a higher priority than r 2 , according to which the defendant is favored on the basis of f δ 1 . In contrast to S 1 , therefore, neither S 2 nor S 3 can contain r 2 . The scenario S 2 represents an outcome in which the court decides for the plaintiff on the basis of r 1 itself. The scenario S 3 represents an outcome in which the court decides for the defendant, but there is no longer the option of justifying this decision on the basis of r 2 . Instead, a decision for the plaintiff must now be based on either r 3 or r 4 .
Conclusion
My goal in this paper has been to set out a new proposal according to which reasoning with precedent is treated as constrained natural reasoning-like natural reasoning, except that the weights, or priorities that a reasoning agent would normally assign to reasons might have to be adjusted in accord with reasons provided by a background case base. The proposal is developed against the background of a model of natural reasoning as default reasoning, with reasons explicated in terms of default rules.
Since the details of the proposal are somewhat complex, a review may be helpful: Cases before a court are represented as sets of factors, each favoring one side or another. Factor reasons are defined as collections of reasons uniformily favoring one particular side, either the plaintiff or the defendant, with the force of factor reasons captured through factor default rules. Each case before a court, then, presents a number of conflicting factor reasons, triggering conflicting factor defaults. Different individuals might assign different weights to these factor reasons, of course, and so to their corresponding factor defaults. The weights that an individual assigns to factor reasons are represented through that individual's value defaults, which define a priority ordering of factor defaults. An individual deciding a case entirely on the basis of his or her own ordering among factor defaults, reflecting only his or her own values, is engaging in purely natural reasoning.
In addition to an individual's own values, there are also, however, other reasons for assigning greater weight to some factor reasons than to others, and so for prioritizing some factor defaults over others. In the modern common law, previously decided cases provide further reasons for favoring certain factor defaults over others; the force of these reasons is represented through case defaults. These case defaults may provide reasons conflicting with those provided by an individual's own values-an individual might disagree with the decisions reached in some previous case. But according to the proposal set out here, considerations of precedent can be thought of as providing individuals with further, higher-level reasons for favoring reasons derived from earlier cases over those deriving from their own values; these reasons are captured by prededent defaults, prioritizing case defaults over value defaults.
The central result of the paper is that an individual taking these higher-level reasons into account but otherwise engaging in natural reasoning will be bound, in any particular case, to reach a decision satisfying the requirements of precedent. The complexity of the paper results from the need to define the necessary concepts carefully enough that this result can be stated clearly, and verified.
The approach sketched here suggestes a number of further problems, of which I will mention only two. First, I have simplified by ignoring the reasoning through which an individual's values support an ordering on factor defaults, collapsing all of this reasoning into a single step. But of course, this simplification would have to be relaxed in developing a richer theory, and when it is, we would then have to consider more sophisticated ways in which accommodating the case defaults derived from a background case base might interfere with the reasoning through which an individual arrives at his or her own ordering on reasons.
Second, I have concentrated on the case in which individuals, in their reasoning, are constrained by precedent, so that they are required to assign case defaults a higher priority than their own value defaults. A different, and perhaps more difficult, question is how we might adapt the present framework to model the reasoning of individuals for whom precedents are persuasive, but not authoritative.
These problems, and others, remain unresolved. But in spite of the problems, and in spite of the complexity of the present proposal, I hope that the ideas mapped out here help to show that the development of a precise theory of reasons and their weight might have applications in a number of different areas.
